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Improving the Federal Procedure for
Imposing Recycled Conditions of
Supervised Release
“If evidence-based sentencing is the new frontier in sentencing policy
and practice, the use of evidence-based processes and data by
judges . . . is the most important terrain in that frontier.”1
INTRODUCTION
Jose Morales-Cruz, age 61, sits in federal court waiting for
his sentence. Sixteen years ago he was convicted of sexual
assault, and he has just been convicted for failing to register as a
sex offender. Jose admits that since his release from prison he has
used drugs, but he hasn’t committed another sex crime. The judge
sentences Jose to a 48-month prison term. At the probation
officer’s recommendation, the judge orders Jose to attend sex-
offender treatment as a condition of supervised release.
According to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
this condition was appropriate because it related to Jose’s failure
to register and his prior offenses.2 This note takes issue with the
First Circuit’s reasoning and argues that when the probation
office recommends a condition of supervised release unrelated to
the specific crime before the court, the defendant should have an
evidentiary hearing to assess that recommendation.
Recent research has changed the way criminal justice
practitioners think about sentencing.3 Scholars have made great
strides in advocating for sentences tailored to a specific defendant,
and in the process, they have drawn attention to the concept of
making sentencing decisions based on evidence instead of
intuition. This notion of “evidence-based” decision-making has
dominated many fields—from medicine to finance to consumer
1 Margareth Etienne, Legal and Practical Implications of Evidence-Based
Sentencing by Judges, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 43, 47 (2009).
2 United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 72 (1st Cir. 2013).
3 MATTHEW KLEINMAN, USING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN SENTENCING
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 299-303 (2012), available at, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/
kc/system/files/matthew_kleiman_2012.pdf.
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products—in recent years.4 In particular, an “evidence-based
sentence” draws on scientific research to address a specific
defendant’s culpability and rehabilitative needs.5
Literature on the benefits of evidence-based sentencing
has exploded in recent years, but no work has considered whether
the current legal framework makes it possible to fully implement
evidence-based sentencing. The current framework is especially
problematic in the context of the “recycled condition”—that is, a
condition of supervised release based on a prior, unrelated
conviction. Courts impose recycled conditions on the belief that a
prior crime can both predict the likelihood of re-offense and inform
the court of the most appropriate sanction. Modern research calls
this belief into question.6 Yet the current model for challenging
those conditions provides little chance to test the government’s
recommendations. In short, evidence suggests that recycled
conditions should be treated with skepticism, but there is little
procedural opportunity to give that conclusion much meaning. An
evidentiary hearing before sentencing, however, would provide a
meaningful opportunity for the defense to cross-examine the
probation officer.
This change would be consistent with recent trends in the
criminal justice system and with constitutional law scholarship.
For years the criminal justice system operated on hunches and
subjective beliefs, but recently, pockets of the criminal justice
system have incorporated more evidence-based processes. Police
forces, for instance, have become more efficient crime fighters by
identifying areas with disproportionate amounts of crime—known
as “hot spots”—and focusing their attention on those areas. The
result has been reduced crime in the areas surrounding the “hot
spot.”7 Based on such documented successes, some commentators
have contemplated “moneyballing” criminal justice—the idea
being that quantitative analysis should dominate decision-
making throughout the system.8 Indeed, even constitutional
scholars acknowledge that procedural due process “must adapt to
4 Id.
5 See id.
6 See infra Part II.B.
7 Hot Spot Policing Can Reduce Crime, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE: OFF. OF
JUST. PROGRAMS (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/strategies/
hot-spot-policing/Pages/welcome.aspx; Implementing and Institutionalizing COMPSTAT
in Maryland, U. OF MD., http://www.compstat.umd.edu/what_is_cs.php (last visited
Feb. 26, 2015).
8 Francis T. Cullen et al., Eight Lessons from Moneyball: The High Cost of
Ignoring Evidence-Based Corrections, 4 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 197, 206-07 (1999),
available at http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/moneyball%20and%20ebp.pdf.
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changing facts and circumstances.”9 Taken together, criminal
justice advancements and the adaptable nature of judicial process
suggest that sentencing procedures are ripe for change.
Part I of this note describes the background of supervised
release and the role supervised release plays in criminal
punishment. Part II discusses the current model for challenging
conditions of supervised release, focusing on the duties of the
Federal Probation Office and the defense attorney, and examines
important scholarship suggesting that: (1) recycled conditions
undermine the purpose of supervised release; (2) conditions can
be unnecessary if criminal behavior decreases over time; and (3)
even if a condition is necessary, courts still need to determine
what type of condition should be imposed. Part III argues that an
evidentiary hearing would be consistent with procedure in related
stages of supervised release and would address the troublesome
nature of recycled conditions.
I. OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE SENTENCING
REFORM ACT
Supervised release is part of the 1984 Sentencing Reform
Act (SRA), which Congress passed in response to the perceived
failure of “indeterminate sentencing.”10 An indeterminate sentence
“impose[s] a minimum and maximum incarceration term, allowing
the possibility of release on parole sometime between the
expiration of those terms.”11 This sentencing model comes from a
strong belief in rehabilitation: not just that rehabilitation is
possible, but that it can be achieved before the end of a prison
term.12 The indeterminate sentence regime puts these ideals into
action by providing parole as a release mechanism.13
The blueprint for indeterminate sentencing originated and
developed abroad.14 In the early 1840s, Australian penologist
Alexander Maconochie devised a plan to reintegrate prisoners
into society.15 In his “mark” system, the goal was to “ignite a
9 Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1317 (2012).
10 Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of
Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 997 (2013); OFFICE OF THE FED. PUB.
DEFENDER, W. DIST. OF TEX., AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL SENTENCING 1 (Bradford W.
Bogan ed., 14th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WEST TEXASDEFENDER].
11 ARTHURW. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 4:2 (3rd ed. 2004).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Doherty, supra note 10, at 976 (“The penologists who brought indeterminacy
and conditional release into American sentencing were part of a self-conscious reform
movement that was based largely on the writings of Maconochie and Crofton.”).
15 Id. at 967-76.
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prisoner’s internal drive to succeed,” and prisoners worked to
shorten their sentences.16 Maconochie believed, moreover, that
released prisoners should not be supervised or controlled.17 English
and Irish reformers in the 1850s echoed this sentiment, believing
that such supervision would “effectually stamp [prisoners] as
individuals belonging to a criminal class.”18
Meanwhile, the United States used retributive sentencing.19
In the retributive model, punishment serves not to rehabilitate
the offender but to rectify the perceived imbalance of a criminal
act.20 Retribution can take two forms, one “weak” and one
“strong.”21 The “weak” conception is that a criminal should receive
a punishment proportionate to his crime because that is what he
deserves; the “strong” conception is “the criminal must be
punished, regardless of the consequences.”22
In 1877, United States policymakers replaced retributivism
with indeterminacy.23 But in the 1960s, crime rates spiked,24 and
by the 1970s, retributivism was back in vogue.25 In 1974,
American sociologist Robert Martinson argued that rehabilitation
efforts had little or no positive impact on recidivism rates.26 His
findings inspired the slogan “nothing works” and popularized the
determinacy movement.27 Determinate sentences carry flat terms
with no possibility for parole.28 Eventually, the determinacy
movement received substantial bipartisan support.29 Despite its
16 Id. at 968.
17 Id. at 969.
18 Id. (quoting Joshua Jebb, Explanations and Showing the Difficulties Which
Would Attend the Introduction into England of the Probationary Stages of Discipline and
Supervision of the Police, &c., Which Have Been Adopted in Ireland, in TRANSACTIONS OF
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, 402, 411, 414
(George W. Hastings ed.1863)).
19 Doherty, supra note 10, at 976.
20 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 2:5.
21 Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive: Retributivism
and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157,
2158-59 (2001).
22 Id.; see also ROGERW. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCINGGUIDELINES
HANDBOOK 4 (2013) (describing “just deserts” as the principle that “punishment should be
scaled to the offender’s culpability and the resulting harms”).
23 Doherty, supra note 10, at 976.
24 Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure, Justice, Ethics, and Zeal, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 2146, 2146 (1998).
25 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 2:5.
26 Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUBLIC INTEREST 22, 25 (1974).
27 Rick Sarre, Presentation at The History of Crime, Policing, and Punishment
Conference: Beyond ‘What Works?’: A 25 Year Jubilee Retrospective of Robert Martinson
2-3 (Dec. 9, 1999), manuscript available at http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/
conferences/hcpp/sarre.pdf.
28 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 4:3.
29 Sarre, supra note 27, at 2-3.
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initial wave of support, the idea that nothing works in corrections
has been debunked by researchers pointing out the various flaws
in Martinson’s study.30 Even Martinson abandoned his findings in
a 1979 law review article.31
By the time Martinson beat his hasty retreat, however, the
determinacy movement had significant support.32 Judge Marvin
Frankel of the Southern District of New York drew particular
attention to the divergent sentences produced by the indeterminate
system and advocated for reduced judicial discretion.33 Also in favor
of a determinate system was penologist Andrew Von Hirsch, who
advocated for a return to the retributive model of sentencing.34
Ultimately, Congress “sought to avoid the confusion and implicit
deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system”
and to ensure that similar crimes were treated similarly and that
different crimes were treated differently.35 Some criticized the new
determinate system as destructive of the judge’s discretion,36 and
indeed some judges took offense, arguing that criminal sentencing
is the most important part of the job.37 In their view, the new
regime merely shifted discretion to prosecutors.38 The Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, however, likely
allayed these concerns by making the sentencing guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory.39
Even before Booker, judges had authority over
supervised release, which replaced parole.40
30 Id. at 3-4.
31 Id. at 4 (citing Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of
Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOF. L. REV. 243, 244, 255 (1979)); Doherty,
supra note 10, at 994-95.
32 See Doherty, supra note 10, at 995.
33 Id. at 992-93 (summarizing Frankel’s position).
34 Id. at 993-94.
35 HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 22, at 2-3.
36 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1940 (1988) (“[T]he Commission can
cure the guidelines’ most fundamental flaws by proposing amendments that draw on
the model of guided, or structured, discretion developed in the context of the Supreme
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.”).
37 See Hon. William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, at the
National Conference on Sentencing Advocacy (1989), in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SENTENCING ADVOCACY 1991: COURSEHANDBOOK SERIES 27 (Mar. 11, 1991).
38 See id. at 25.
39 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); see alsoWEST TEXASDEFENDER, supra note 10, at 1
(“Under the system created by Booker, judges enjoy far more discretion in their
sentencing decisions than they were allowed under the mandatory-guidelines regime. The
fact that the guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory can have a tremendous
effect on a particular defendant’s sentence.”).
40 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO
SUPERVISED RELEASE 1 (July 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
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Supervised release is a “unique” type of post-confinement monitoring
that is overseen by federal district courts with the assistance of
federal probation officers, rather than by the United States Parole
Commission. A sentencing court is authorized (and, in some cases,
required) to impose a term of supervised release in addition to a
term of imprisonment. While on supervised release after reentry into
the community following release from imprisonment, an offender is
required to abide by certain conditions, some mandated by statute
and others imposed at the court’s discretion. If an offender violates a
condition, a court is authorized (and, in some cases, required) to
“revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to
serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release without
credit for time previously served on post[-]release supervision . . . .”41
Congress designed supervised release to promote rehabilitation
and reintegration.42 Unlike parole, though, supervised release
begins only after the prison term. Moreover, supervised release
was never intended to incorporate a revocation mechanism,43
which authorizes the judge to “impose a new sentence which
includes a prison sentence.”44 Yet Congress “grafted the revocation
mechanism for probation onto supervised release, ignoring the
different theoretical roots of those systems.”45 Fiona Doherty makes
the interesting point that revocation actually creates a perverse
form of indeterminacy, the very model Congress hoped to avoid.46
Others argue that revocation makes supervised release an agent of
sustained punishment rather than reintegration.47 Notwithstanding
the internal inconsistencies created by the revocation mechanism,




41 Id. (quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) and
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006)).
42 Id. at 2 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000)).
43 Jennifer Gilg, Research & Writing Specialist, Presentation at the District of
Nebraska Multi-Track Federal Criminal Defense Seminar: The Fine Print: Strategies for
Avoiding Restrictive Conditions of Supervised Release 1 (Aug. 2011), manuscript available
at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics—-common-offenses/fine_print.pdf (citing Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromise Upon Which They Rest,
17 HOFSTRAL.REV. 1, 125 (1988)); see also Doherty, supra note 10, at 999-1000.
44 Supervised Release, FED. DEFENDERS OF N.Y., http://federaldefendersny.org/
information-for-client-and-families/supervised-release.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
45 Doherty, supra note 10, at 1002.
46 Id. at 1009.
47 See Gilg, supra note 43, at 2 (citing Paula Kei Biderman & Jon M. Sands,
A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G
REPORT 204 (1994)).
48 See infra Part III.B.
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18 U.S.C. § 3583 provides the framework for imposing
discretionary conditions of supervised release.49 A condition
must “be ‘reasonably related’ to ‘the nature and circumstances
of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
deterrence of criminal conduct, protection of the public, and
treatment of the defendant’s correctional needs.’”50 A valid
condition needs to meet only one of these sentencing goals.51
Still, conditions may involve “no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary” to deter further criminal
behavior, protect the public, and rehabilitate.52
Courts have held that § 3583 authorizes conditions of
supervised release that are unrelated to the instant conviction,53
including recycled conditions based on prior convictions.54 Courts
seem particularly willing to impose recycled conditions against
defendants with prior sex offenses.55 Indeed, commentators have
observed that sex offenders bear the brunt of deterrent efforts, as
judges have been imposing severe prison terms and conditions of
supervised release.56
But defendants have some ammunition against recycled
conditions. If the defendant challenges a condition, the government
bears the burden of proving its validity.57 And there are some stock
arguments against the recycled condition.58 The next sections
describe these defenses, and their deficiencies, in greater detail.
II. CHALLENGING THECONDITIONS OF SUPERVISEDRELEASE
Sentencing procedure comes from the Supreme Court’s
statement in Mathews v. Eldridge that the appropriate process is
determined “by balancing (1) the nature of the individual interest
49 HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 22, at 1431.
50 Doe v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 958 F. Supp. 2d 254, 261 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583 (2012)).
51 United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 344 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1995)).
52 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Camp, 410 F.3d 1042, 1044, 1046 (8th Cir. 2005)
(deeming permissible a condition that defendant “reveal financial information to the
probation office” for possessing a firearm in light of prior unpaid child support).
54 See, e.g., Dupes, 513 F.3d at 342 (deeming permissible a condition related
to prior sex offense in case involving securities fraud).
55 See HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 22, at 1461 n.118 (collecting cases).
56 Gilg, supra note 43, at 3-4.
57 United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 558 (9th Cir. 2006).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632, 633 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The
conditions do not relate to the offense of conviction, and the record does not show that they
were reasonably necessary to deter the defendant from repeating his sex crime, which
occurred 15 years ago.”).
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affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the procedure used, (3) the probable value, if any, of
additional safeguards, and (4) the government’s interest, including
fiscal and administrative burdens.”59 More concretely, two basic
rules guide much of sentencing: the defendant is not entitled to all
protections of the rules of evidence, and he does not have all the
protections of the Constitution.60 These rules drastically reduce a
defendant’s ability to challenge and defeat conditions of
supervised release.
A. Current Model
Defense counsel and the probation office are the primary
players at sentencing. Indeed, defense counsel’s responsibilities
continue well past the end of trial, and sentencing arguably “has
as much—and often more—ultimate impact on clients and society
than verdicts of guilt.”61 A large portion of the government’s work,
on the other hand, shifts to the probation office, which devises the
presentence report (PSR).62 “The importance of the presentence
report cannot be overstated. In it, the probation officer will
recommend fact findings, guideline calculations, and potential
grounds for departure . . . . The report can also affect the conditions
of probation or supervised release.”63 In addition to playing a major
role in determining the sentence, the PSR continues to be used by
correctional officials long after the sentence has been entered,
including for such purposes as designation and custody
classification within the federal prison system.64
59 United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
60 David Debold, Sentencing Procedure, in PRACTICE UNDER THE FED.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8.03 (2015); see also 2011 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 6A1.3 (Resolution of Disputed Factors (Policy Statement)), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/6a1_3.htm.
61 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 13:1.
62 Id. § 10:2 (“In the federal system, where court rule directs probation officers to
make presentence reports for all offenders, a sentencing judge must take affirmative action
in order to halt the report’s preparation.” (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1))).
63 WEST TEXASDEFENDER, supra note 10, at 26.
64 Gregory W. Carman & Tamar Harutunian, Fairness at the Time of
Sentencing: The Accuracy of the Presentence Report, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 6 (2004); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: INMATE
SECURITY DESIGNATION AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION 4 (2006), available at
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf.
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1. The Contents of the Presentence Report
The PSR may be described generally as a “mixture of
facts, conclusions, and recommendations.”65 The PSR is prepared
by the Federal Probation Office, which may use its “virtually
unlimited sources, including files of the prosecutor and court
records normally sealed from public scrutiny.”66 For example, it is
likely that the probation officer handling a defendant previously
convicted of a sex offense will examine the records of that prior
offense.67 There are dangers to this lenient policy, not least of
which is inaccurate information. Indeed, “[m]any presentence
report recommendations, while nominally objective, have a
significant subjective component. The probation officer’s attitude
toward the case or the client may substantially influence the
report’s sentencing recommendations.”68 Nevertheless, the PSR
serves as the sentencing judge’s primary point of reference; in
fact, the judge can simply adopt the PSR.69 And as general legal
policy, appellate courts fully support the trial judge’s pursuit of
any and all relevant information at sentencing, rarely reversing
trial judges “for considering too much information, although
sometimes for considering too little.”70
Still, in an effort to balance the PSR and the high amount
of deference it receives, courts maintain that the “defendant has a
due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of information
that is materially false.”71 As a result, the defendant has an
opportunity to refute the PSR,72 and the defendant must see the
PSR before sentencing.73 In the current system, though, the
available methods for challenging the PSR make this step little
more than a formality.
65 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 9:6.
66 Id. § 11:1.
67 Gilg, supra note 43, at 7.
68 WEST TEXAS DEFENDER, supra note 10, at 26; but see United States v.
Flores, 725 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that a court may not “adopt
conclusory statements unsupported by facts” (citing United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d
786, 789 (9th Cir. 1992))).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In
addition to the mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release, the court imposed
several special conditions relating to Dupes’s prior sex offenses. The court adopted these
special conditions from the presentence report that the probation office had prepared.”).
70 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 9:5.
71 Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
72 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 10:4.
73 Id. § 9:7 (“[W]here defense counsel is not allowed to inspect the court’s
presentence report, and where the trial court does not state honestly the reasons for its
sentence, it is difficult—and often impossible—for an appellate court to determine whether
a sentence is based upon incorrect information.”).
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2. Defense Counsel’s Limited Ability to Challenge the PSR
There are a few methods of challenging conditions of
supervised release. Defense counsel can submit a memorandum
in opposition to the government’s PSR.74 Presentence studies may
also be an effective means of challenging the PSR, although they
sometimes require the “client’s institutionalization during that
period.”75 Short of requesting a study, defense counsel may submit
current correctional literature supporting his recommendations.76
Additionally, some stock objections to recycled conditions
have emerged. For instance, counsel might challenge the
condition’s relationship to the current crime, its effect on liberty, or
its temporal distance from the present case.77 For defendants with
a prior sex offense, recent studies may afford the most persuasive
challenge to their recycled conditions.78 Although the government
must overcome these challenges and there may be an increased
judicial receptiveness to such findings, these arguments are
generally difficult because the offender receives little sympathy.79
B. Evidence-Based Sentencing
As defendants toiled under this model for challenging
conditions, scholars were radically changing the criminal justice
community’s view of criminality and corrections. Abandoning
traditional notions of sentencing, scholars used quantitative
analyses to identify traits that cause crime, to better determine
risk, and to tailor sanctions in productive ways.80 The preference
for quantitative decision-making at sentencing has been dubbed
“evidence-based sentencing.”81
This is a welcome development and, compared to other
disciplines utilizing statistical approaches to problem solving,
criminal sentencing is late to the game. Actuarial assessment in
other fields has proven more effective than “clinical judgment.”82
74 WEST TEXASDEFENDER, supra note 10, at 21.
75 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, § 13:6 (warning that “before requesting
presentence studies, counsel should discuss their relative benefits—including
treatment potential—with client as part of an overall sentencing strategy”).
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Gilg, supra note 43, at 9-18.
78 Id. at 7.
79 Id. at 8.
80 See EDWARD J. LATESSA & PAULA SMITH, CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY
215 (5th ed. 2011).
81 KLEINMAN, supra note 3.
82 J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2011).
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Other aspects of the criminal justice system have been improved
by evidence-based approaches. New York City’s CompStat
system, for instance, revolutionized the way police departments
target crime,83 and in the pre-trial phase, statistical assessment
has produced risk models that better predict a defendant’s risk
of flight and re-arrest.84 In each instance, substantive outcomes
improved because evidence guided the decision-making process.
The current procedure for challenging conditions of
supervised release, though, does not adequately incorporate the
recent advances in the science of criminal justice. Specifically,
the current procedure provides no meaningful opportunity to
test recommendations—particularly in the context of recycled
conditions—that may have little or no justifiable foundation.
Recent articles on the goal of reintegrating offenders,85 the
trajectory of criminal behavior over an individual’s life,86 and the
risk-needs analysis87 suggest that in many cases, a recycled
condition will have little or no correctional or protective value.
Defendants need more opportunities to bring that information to
bear in the sentencing process.
1. Preventing Reintegration
Various authorities make clear that supervised release
has become a punitive measure.88 But the United States
Sentencing Commission maintains that supervised release eases
the defendant’s transition into society by promoting reintegration
83 Implementing and Institutionalizing COMPSTAT in Maryland, supra note 7.
84 See, e.g., CHARLES SUMMERS, PH.D. & TIM WILLIS, PH.D., PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1-3 (2010), available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
PretrialRiskAssessmentResearchSummary.pdf; see generally LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1-5 (2013),
available at http://arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF-research-summary_
PSA-Court_4_1.pdf.
85 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration, in CRIMINOLOGICAL
THEORY: PAST TO PRESENT 253, 253 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2011).
86 See Terrie E. Moffitt, Pathways in the Life Course to Crime, in
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: PAST TO PRESENT, supra note 85, at 477; Robert J. Sampson &
John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters? Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys
Followed to Age 70, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 555, 556-57 (2003).
87 LATESSA & SMITH, supra note 80, at 215; PATRICIA VAN VOORHIS ET AL.,
CORRECTIONAL COUNSELING&REHABILITATION 250 (7th ed. 2009).
88 United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[S]upervised
release, like parole, is an integral part of the punishment for the underlying offense.”);
United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that supervised release is
“simply part of the whole matrix of punishment which arises out of a defendant’s original
crimes” (internal quotations omitted)); WEST TEXASDEFENDER, supra note 10, at 5 (“Unlike
probation, supervised release is a common punishment, imposed in addition to the sentence
of imprisonment.”).
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and rehabilitation.89 Indeed, the Sentencing Commission
describes reintegration as the “primary purpose of supervised
release.”90 In light of a number of factors, recycled conditions
undermine that purpose.
First, we must accept that a recycled condition is
shameful to a defendant. The fact that a condition is shameful
doesn’t automatically make it an inappropriate sanction,
though. It merely poses a question: is the shaming consistent
with the goals of supervised release? That depends on the
nature of the shaming condition.
Reintegrative shaming is shaming which is followed by efforts to
reintegrate the offender back into the community of lawabiding or
respectable citizens through words or gestures of forgiveness or
ceremonies to decertify the offender as deviant . . . . Stigmatization is
disintegrative shaming in which no effort is made to reconcile the
offender with the community. The offender is outcast, her deviance is
allowed to become a master status, degradation ceremonies are not
followed by ceremonies to decertify deviance.91
Discerning integration from stigmatization can be fact-intensive,
but the issue can be simplified by asking whether the sanction
promotes interdependence or labels the offender.92 To the extent
that the condition stems from control theory or repulsion, it
undermines a goal of supervised release—reintegration.93 As a
result, policymakers should provide a mechanism to determine
which kind of sanction is at issue.94 If the recycled condition
appears to stigmatize the defendant, there needs to be serious
consideration as to how much stigmatization can be tolerated
before the condition begins to undermine the system.
89 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2 n.11 (describing the “primary
purpose of supervised release” as “facilitat[ing] the reintegration of federal prisoners back
into the community”). It may be that one must be careful in comparing the systems, as they
operate much differently; after all, supervised release is added to incarceration, while parole
replaces part of incarceration. Doherty, supra note 10, at 1005. Still, courts have generally
compared the legal frameworks of parole and supervised release. See, e.g., Johnson v.
United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (holding that revocation penalties must be attributed to
the original offense rather than the reason for revocation).
90 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2 n.11.
91 Braithwaite, supra note 85, at 258-59.
92 Id. at 255; see also Doherty, supra note 10, at 1025 (“In evaluating the
utility of any particular condition, courts should distinguish between conditions that
are aimed simply at establishing control over ‘criminals’ and conditions that provide
reintegrative services, such as job-training or mental health treatment.”).
93 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2.
94 See Doherty, supra note 10, at 1023 (“[I]t is appropriate to consider an
approach to supervised release in which transitional rehabilitation (and by implication
successful reentry) is the primary goal.”).
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2. Trajectory of Criminal Behavior
The key difference between supervised release and parole is
that supervised release begins only after the defendant completes
his prison term.95 This is a crucial facet of the recycled condition:
the condition, based on already-punished behavior, begins at a
distant point in the future. (Recall that Jose Morales-Cruz’s sex
offender treatment was set to begin almost twenty years after his
conviction for sexual assault.) In other words, there is an
undeniable gap between the punishment and the conduct.
This implicates a major focus of recent criminological
study: what naturally happens to an offender’s criminal
behavior over time?96 Professor Terrie Moffitt, for instance,
distinguishes between the adolescent offender and the “life-
course” offender,97 but she notes that even in the life-course
offender, criminality often manifests itself differently depending
on the stage of life.98 So even if an offender has a persistent
criminal disposition, he may not repeat the same type of
criminal behavior. Others believe that the type of offense, rather
than age, is the best indicator of re-offense.99 Probably the most
common example of this “typological approach”100 is that sex
offenders have prolonged criminal careers.101
But in recent years, the work of Professors Robert
Sampson and John Laub has carried the day.102 They believe
95 See supra Part I.
96 SeeMoffitt, supra note 86, at 479; Sampson & Laub, supra note 86.
97 Moffitt, supra note 86, at 479.
98 Id. at 479-87. Sampson and Laub describe Moffitt’s “dual taxonomy focusing
on [the] life-course persistent and adolescence-limited offenders [as] the leading example”
of the developmental approach. Sampson & Laub, supra note 86, at 557.
99 Todd R. Clear, Ph.D., Presentation at The Unintended Consequences of
Incarceration Conference: Backfire: When Incarceration Increases Crime 7 (Jan. 1996),
available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/uci.pdf (“It is
now becoming clear that different types of crime have different patterns of replacement
and age-rate deterioration.”); but see Sampson & Laub, supra note 86, at 557 (observing
that such “typological approaches” actually rest on very old notions of criminality, i.e.
the atavistic type).
100 Sampson & Laub, supra note 86, at 557.
101 BARBARA BOSLAUGH HANER, UNDERSTANDING SEX OFFENDERS: WHAT THE
SEX OFFENDER TELLS US 1, available at http://www.ferry-county.com/Courts%20and%
20Law/Sex%20Offender%20Info/Understanding_Sex_Offenders.pdf (“[W]hile most other
criminals decrease their criminal activity as they age, sex offenders typically do not.
Instead, most sex offenders continue to offend their targeted populations until they are
physically incapable.”).
102 Their work resulted in the 2011 Stockholm Prize. See Robert J. Sampson:
Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences; Director of the Boston Area Research
Initiative, HARV. U., http://scholar.harvard.edu/sampson/content/crime-and-life-course (last
visited Feb. 26, 2015).
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that offenders offend less as they age,103 and although re-
offense may decline at different rates, Sampson’s and Laub’s
lengthy longitudinal study of individuals with delinquent
childhoods104 uncovered a definite downward trend:
[F]or those men who survived to age 50, 24% had no arrests for
predatory crime (crimes of violence and property) after age 17 (6%
had no arrests for total crime); 48% had no arrests for predatory
crime after age 25 (19% for total crime); 60% had no arrests for
predatory crime after age 31 (33% for total crime); and 79% had no
arrests for predatory crime after age 40 (57% for total crime).105
In the context of recycled conditions, this raises a red flag. If
individual criminal behavior naturally decreases over time, it
is reasonable to question a sanction that takes effect so long
after the crime occurs.
3. Matching Defendants to the Appropriate Type of
Sanction.
Another crucial element of accurate sentencing is
matching the defendant to the correct type of sanction, and in this
area criminal justice research has made great strides by applying
the risk and needs principles.106 These principles are simple and
powerful. According to the risk principle, “supervision and
treatment levels should match the offender’s level of risk,” and
according to the needs principle, “treatment services should target
an offender’s criminogenic needs—those dynamic risk factors
most associated with criminal behavior.”107
In conjunction with the risk/needs approach, researchers
advocate the use of “actuarial assessment[, which] involves using
an objective, mechanistic, reproducible combination of predictive
factors, selected and validated through empirical research, against
103 Sampson & Laub, supra note 86, at 555-56; see also Etienne, supra note 1,
at 57 (noting that “even high-risk offenders ‘age out’ of crime by their forties”).
104 Sampson & Laub, supra note 86, at 556.
105 See id. at 569.
106 PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A NATIONAL WORKING
GROUP 1 (2011), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%
20Experts/Areas%20of%20expertise/Sentencing%20Probation/RNA%20Guide%20Final
.ashx (“During the last two decades, substantial research has demonstrated that the
use of certain practices in criminal justice decision making can have a profound effect
on reducing offender recidivism. One of these practices is the use of validated risk and
needs assessment (RNA) instruments to inform the decision making process.”).
107 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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known outcomes that have been also been quantified.”108 Studies
have shown that these approaches “provide significantly more
accurate predictions” than prior methods.109 And although actuarial
prediction models have raised constitutional concerns,110 state
judges say these practices promote “smarter” sentencing.111 Lastly,
in addition to risk and need, officials must consider the defendant’s
responsiveness—his capacity to internalize sanctions and change
behavior. “Taken together, the three preceding RNR principles call
for assessing an offender’s risk of reoffending [and] matching
supervision and treatment to the offender’s risk level.”112
In short, evidence-based sentencing makes one thing
clear: static factors, like criminal history, “have no treatment
implications.”113 For example, even if a defendant is still a threat
to commit crimes,114 criminal history alone will not reveal which
sanctions are most likely to prevent future crimes by this
particular defendant.115 In fact, focusing on prior conduct and
failing to consider all the relevant factors can be shockingly
counterproductive. Studies have shown, for instance, that
although “intensive rehabilitation supervision program[s] worked
for higher-risk offenders, [they] actually increased recidivism
rates for lower-risk offenders.”116
Furthermore, it is crucial to base sentencing decisions on
appropriate information because, for all intents and purposes,
after sentencing, there is no turning back. Even if correctional
officers eventually identify an error in the risk-needs assessment
of the defendant, they are “required to implement the sentence
even though it is not an effective use of resources and may even
increase the offender’s likelihood of reoffending.”117 Commentators
have observed a similar pattern in the context of probation,
108 Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing
Policy and Practice, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 4 (2009) (quoting Kirk Heilbrun et al.,
Risk-Assessment in Evidence-Based Sentencing: Context and Promising Uses, 1 CHAP.
J. CRIM. JUST. 127, 127 (2009)).
109 Id. at 4.
110 See Etienne, supra note 1, at 49.
111 CASEY ET AL., supra note 106, at 3.
112 Id. at 6.
113 VAN VOORHIS, supra note 87, at 250.
114 See supra Part II.B.2.
115 Cf. United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2013)
(Torruella, J., dissenting) (explaining that the court should adjust its conditions to the
type of criminal conduct imagined; for instance, sex-offender treatment is not
reasonable for someone with general criminal tendency).
116 LATESSA & SMITH, supra note 80, at 218; see also CASEY ET AL., supra note
106, at 4 (“One program, in particular, is most illustrative of the risk principle: it
showed (relative to a comparison group) a decrease in recidivism of 32 percent for high
risk offenders and an increase in recidivism of 29 percent for low risk offenders.”).
117 CASEY ET AL., supra note 106, at 7.
1568 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
noting that the judge’s conditions create the “legal
framework . . . for the probationer’s supervision,” and that
“unnecessary or counterproductive probation conditions distract[ ]
and impede[ ] both the probation department and offender.”118
In summary, the success of the correctional process
depends in large part on painting an accurate portrait of the
defendant at the time of sentencing. And the procedure for
marshalling and challenging facts seriously affects the final
outcome. The current procedure, though, is dated and inaccurate.
III. A NEWMETHOD FOR CHALLENGING RECYCLED
CONDITIONS
The federal system provides defendants with an
opportunity to be heard before sentencing.119 Defense counsel is
charged with objecting to the contents of the PSR, and there
may be an opportunity to have a presentence study done in
order to gauge the defendant’s needs.120 But criminal justice
researchers are increasingly discovering how important it is to
develop an accurate picture of the defendant’s likelihood to
reoffend, as the information collected at sentencing impacts the
defendant’s reintegration and the success of any conditions.121
After collecting all this information, it is still up to the judge to
apply that information appropriately.122
In order to optimize evidence-based practices, information
must be conveyed in the best possible manner.123 This is
particularly important in the case of recycled conditions, where
the defense can potentially make significant challenges to the
government’s recommendations.124 Indeed, since evidence-based
sentencing is here to stay, it may be time to consider how to
regulate its use and to maximize its benefits.125 Some have
118 HON. J. RICHARD COUZENS, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES REDUCING
RECIDIVISM TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY: A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY COURTS AND
PROBATION 7 (2011), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/EVIDENCE-
BASED-PRACTICES-Summary-6-27-11.pdf.
119 See supra Part II.A.2.
120 See id.
121 Etienne, supra note 1, at 47-48 (“What judges do at sentencing—and by
correlation, what the statutes permit them to do—inevitably determines the flexibility
that evidence-based corrections and supervision officials can exercise later.”).
122 HON. COUZENS, supra note 118, at 10.
123 See CASEY ET AL., supra note 106, at 8 (“Jurisdictions need to carefully plan
the incorporation of offender assessment information into the sentencing process to
optimize its benefits.”).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Moralez-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 79 (2013) (Torruella,
J., dissenting); see also supra Part II.A.2.
125 Redding, supra note 108, at 8.
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suggested, for example, that “[i]n most instances, the use of risk-
assessment tools ‘are not subject to any form of external
scrutiny.’ This lack of scrutiny raises important problems of
reliability and transparency.”126
It may be that the most effective means of updating
criminal sentencing is educating the judiciary and its agents.127
But even if such programs effectively educate probation
officers,128 there is still the most important government agent to
consider: the judge. Some suggest that the judge should be party
to these training sessions,129 but that approach may compromise
the integrity of the judicial institution and the adversarial
system, which is generally responsible for conveying information
to the court.130
Although defendants are not afforded the full protection of
the Constitution at sentencing,131 there is the possibility of an
evidentiary hearing before the final disposition. An evidentiary
hearing offers greater opportunity to examine facts and
witnesses, which would facilitate evidence-based sentencing in
the context of recycled conditions. These hearings, however, can
be difficult to obtain.
A. Standard Process for Obtaining an Evidentiary Hearing
A criminal defendant’s protections decrease after his or
her conviction: “the defendant may have a limited opportunity to
take discovery and ‘has no absolute right either to present his
own witnesses or to receive a full-blown evidentiary hearing.’”132
126 Etienne, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting Justice David P. Cole, The Umpire
Strikes Back: Canadian Judicial Experience with Risk Assessment Instruments, 49
CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY&CRIM. JUST. 493, 494 (2007)).
127 CASEY ET AL., supra note 106, at 21.
128 Etienne, supra note 1, at 54 (describing the cross-examination of a
Canadian probation officer, who admitted that he had only minimal training on a
particular assessment instrument, and “did not feel he was properly trained to
comment on the risk of re-offending”).
129 CASEY ET AL., supra note 106, at 21.
130 Part 1 of Q&A with Chief Justice John Roberts, YOUTUBE.COM (Oct. 24,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqP5o6AnRMk (last visited Feb. 23, 2015)
(When asked whether judges look to outside expertise when resolving cases, Chief
Justice Roberts responded, “The answer is pretty much no, and that’s a good thing. The
people who are supposed to do that for us are the lawyers. That’s the way the system
works. . . . It means the lawyer’s job is harder.”).
131 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding that the right
to confront witnesses does not apply to statements made in a presentence report); see
also supra Part II.A.
132 See, e.g., Kosinski v. C.I.R., 541 F.3d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing
criminal sentencing from civil proceedings) (quoting SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192
F.3d 295, 305 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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As a result, in the vast majority of cases it suffices that “the
defendant is afforded some opportunity to rebut the Government’s
allegations.”133 This opportunity normally takes the form of
written memoranda to the court, although the intrepid defense
counselor may have a study prepared.134
Though defendants do not receive evidentiary hearings as
a matter of course, the analysis of technical or scientific data—for
instance, the chemical characteristics and similarities between
two types of narcotics—may require a hearing.135 The Supreme
Court has even applied similar reasoning in requiring evidentiary
hearings before the revocation of supervised release.136 Since
revocation has similar conceptual and policy concerns to recycled
conditions, that process would also be appropriate before
imposing recycled conditions.
B. Copying the Revocation Process
The defendant sentenced to a term of supervised release
is entitled to a hearing in two instances, although in both cases
this occurs after the initial sentencing order. First, the defendant
must have a hearing before his term of supervised release is
modified,137 meaning that the defendant must have “notice and
an opportunity to be heard.”138 But this is not an evidentiary
hearing;139 rather, this opportunity to be heard seems more like
a standard sentencing hearing.140
133 United States v. Ford, 530 F. App’x 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2013).
134 See supra Part II.A.2.
135 See United States v. Figueroa, 647 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2011) (regarding the
similarity for sentencing purposes of two drugs).
136 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); United States v.
Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1997).
137 Lowenstein, 108 F.3d at 84 (“A hearing and assistance of counsel are
required before the terms or conditions of probation or supervised release can be
modified, unless the relief to be granted to the person on probation or supervised
release upon the person’s request or the court’s own motion is favorable to the person,
and the attorney for the government, after having been given notice of the proposed
relief and a reasonable opportunity to object, has not objected. An extension of the term
of probation or supervised release is not favorable to the person for the purposes of this
rule.” (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b))).
138 United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011)
(discussing advisory committee’s note to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1).
139 United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (“But a Rule
32.1(c) modification—as opposed to a Rule 32.1(b) revocation—does not require an
evidentiary hearing or a violation finding.”).
140 Compare King, 608 F.3d at 1130 (“[P]roviding for ‘a hearing, at which the
person has the right to counsel and an opportunity to make a statement and present any
information in mitigation’ before ‘modif[ication]’” (quoting FED.R.CRIM. P 32.1(c)), with Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (Breyer, J.) (“The sentencing judge, as a matter of
process, will normally begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation
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Second, before revocation of supervised release,141 the
defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.142 The procedural
requirements of revocation hearings are drawn from those
required at parole hearings in the pre-Guidelines era.143
Specifically, the defendant is entitled to:
(a) [W]ritten notice of the claimed violation of parole; (b) disclosure
to the parolee [individual on supervised release] of evidence against
him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and
detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons
for revoking parole.144
So an evidentiary hearing provides greater opportunity than an
ordinary hearing to test facts and credibility. In Morrissey v.
Brewer, the Supreme Court described its justifications for requiring
this level of process before revocation.145 Those justifications are
present in cases of recycled conditions, too.
1. The Qualified Liberty Interest
TheMorrissey court began by noting the purpose of parole
in the federal system: “to help individuals reintegrate into society
as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being
confined for the full term of the sentence imposed.”146 Since parole
concerned early release from prison, it differed from supervised
of the Guidelines. [ ] He may hear arguments by prosecution or defense that the
Guidelines sentence should not apply, perhaps because (as the Guidelines themselves
foresee) the case at hand falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission intends
individual Guidelines to apply, [ ] perhaps because the Guidelines sentence itself fails
properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or perhaps because the case warrants a different
sentence regardless [ ] . Thus, the sentencing court subjects the defendant’s sentence to the
thorough adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure.”).
141 Revocation can occur for a variety of reasons, ranging from substantive conduct
violations to simple technical violations. Doherty, supra note 10, at 1016 (“Non-criminal
violations, also known as technical violations, commonly include conduct such as failing to
report to the probation officer, failing to submit monthly reports, and failing to attend drug
or mental health treatment. In general, among defendants who were sent back to prison,
the average term of re-imprisonment was eleven months.”).
142 Lowenstein, 108 F.3d at 85.
143 Id.
144 Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
145 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477.
146 Id.; see also supra Part II.B.1.
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release, but both processes share the goal of reintegration.147 The
Court went on to describe two primary reasons for the requirement
of a hearing before revocation.
Since this is a question of procedural due process, the first
consideration is the nature of the liberty interest at stake.
“Implicit in the system’s concern with parole violations is the
notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as
he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole.”148 In other
words, parole grants a special type of liberty. On one hand, parole
creates “not [an] absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,
but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions.”149 On the other hand,
“the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many
of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination
inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.”150
Under the supervised release statute, defendants with
prior convictions have a similarly qualified liberty. If convicted
of another crime, § 3583 opens the door to sanctions based on the
prior conviction, provided that the sanction is reasonably related
to the defendant’s history and the accepted goals of sentencing.151
Thus, § 3583 subjects federal defendants to supervised release in
much the same way parole subjected them to imprisonment: they
are free of the original charge unless there is another violation, in
which case they may resume punishment related to that offense.
Undoubtedly, the stakes are different for these two
offenders: parolees risk going back to prison, whereas defendants
faced with recycled conditions—like Jose Morales-Cruz—risk
losing free time to mandatory sanctions like sex offender
treatment. Still, both scenarios present punishments, and
individuals on supervised release stand a fair chance of returning
to prison.152 One-third of federal offenders have supervised release
revoked, and in around 60% of those cases revocation was based
on mere technical violations.153 In other words, “no one who
receives supervised release receives a determinate sentence.”154 As
a result, both the parolee and the defendant faced with a recycled
condition are at risk of extended confinement.
147 SeeU.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2 & n.11.
148 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479.
149 Id. at 480.
150 Id. at 482.
151 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012).
152 Doherty, supra note 10, at 1015-16.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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Some appellate courts avoid the idea that a recycled
condition is duplicative, holding that a recycled condition relates
only to the instant conviction.155 In United States v. Dupes, for
instance, a defendant convicted of securities fraud challenged his
conditions of supervised release related to prior sex offenses, and
the Second Circuit rejected his double jeopardy challenge.156 The
Court reasoned that because federal law permits consideration of
prior offenses in devising the current sentence, any conditions
would be considered punishment for “his current securities fraud
offense,” and for that reason could not be considered “successive
punishment.”157 Other judges have challenged similar lines of
reasoning.158 For example, Judge Torruella, in his United States v.
Moralez-Cruz dissent, disagreed with the imposition of sex
offender treatment because he found
the majority’s reasoning [ ] ripe for double counting, rationalizing a
district court’s discretion to impose a special condition outside the
Sentencing Guidelines to increase a sentence due to a harm that has
already been fully accounted for and based on temporally distant
sex-offense and failure-to-register convictions that the defendant has
already served sentences for.159
Nevertheless, § 3583 enables the district court to impose these
conditions, so the question is not whether courts have the power
to do this in the first place. The question is what process increases
the odds of a good decision. Accordingly, the Morrissey court
reasoned that a hearing is required before revocation because
although the government has an interest in returning criminals
to prison in some cases, “the State has no interest in revoking
parole without some informal procedural guarantees.”160
2. Significant Questions of Correctional Utility
TheMorrissey court stressed that the review board should
revoke parole only if it would be useful. So revocation requires a
two-pronged inquiry. First, the court determines if parole was
violated, which will likely be a straightforward appraisal of the
155 See United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2008).
156 Id. at 344.
157 Id. (emphasis added).
158 United States v. Moralez-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2013) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the condition of supervised release was for a conviction which had
already been prosecuted and the sentence served). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that in the context of revocation of supervised release, the revocation must be
attributed to the original conduct. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694 (2000).
159 Moralez-Cruz, 712 F.3d at 78.
160 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
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facts.161 But revocation does not necessarily follow from the mere
fact of a violation; the second inquiry is whether revocation is
warranted.162 This second inquiry “involves the application of
expertise by the parole authority in making a prediction as to the
ability of the individual to live in society without committing
antisocial acts.”163 Thus, the defendant has a liberty interest in
this prediction and the state “has an interest in not having parole
revoked because of erroneous information or because of an
erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole.”164
Recycled conditions present a similar issue. When the
court is trying to predict the necessity of future sanctions, the
facts are only part of the process. Implementing evidence-based
sanctions requires a full consideration of the defendant’s risk and
needs,165 as well as the likelihood of re-offense in the absence of
additional sanctions.166 This is particularly important in the
context of recycled conditions, where courts impose sanctions
wholly on the basis of a prior wrong.167
United States v. Morales-Cruz is an excellent example of
the dangers involved with recycled conditions and how an
evidentiary hearing could promote conditions based on a nuanced
approach to the facts.168 There, the District Court determined that
the defendant
has a lack of respect for other individuals. He has prior records that
include criminal sexual assault, failure to register, and battery,
among others. It reflects that as an individual he has a lack of
control, and there is a need to protect the community from this
individual . . . . The Court must protect the community from
individuals like Mr. Morales who openly disrespect the law by
engaging in continuous criminal conduct and fail to abide by their
supervision convictions, as failing to register as reflected in the
presentence investigation report.169
161 Id. at 479.
162 Id. at 479-80. But a defendant waives his right to an evidentiary hearing
by admitting that a violation occurred. United States v. Shidler, 337 F. App’x 772, 777
(10th Cir. 2009) (“When a defendant admits guilt, a full revocation hearing is not
necessary.” (citing United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008))); United
States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 2005). This seems to contradict the
Supreme Court’s rationale inMorrissey.
163 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
164 Id. at 484.
165 See supra Part II.B.3.
166 See supra Part II.B.2.
167 See id.
168 See United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 72-74 (1st Cir. 2013).
169 Id. at 74.
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The First Circuit held that this approach met the “critical test
[ ] whether the condition is reasonably related to one or more
of the goals of supervised release.”170 The majority found that
the defendant’s “continuing failures certainly permit a rational
inference that [he] presented a recidivism risk,” and the
“imposition of sex-offender treatment was reasonably related to
[his] present offense as well as to his criminal history.”171 Judge
Torruella’s dissent suggested that the majority’s line of reasoning
was speculative at best.172 In addition to noting that the prior sex
offense happened long ago,173 Judge Torruella said that neither
the defendant’s failure to register under SORNA nor his recent
assault conviction necessitated the use of sex-offense treatment.174
In sum, the defendant “may have demonstrated a proven proclivity
towards criminal conduct, but not towards sexual offenses.”175
This dialogue demonstrates the need for more effective
delivery of evidence to the court. At sentencing in this case,
defense counsel objected to the imposition of sexual treatment
on supervised release.176 The current adversarial model had
been utilized, yet it appears that the District Court and the
First Circuit failed to consider some of the basic tenets of
evidence-based sentencing that Judge Torruella mentions in
his dissent, such as matching risk to need.177
Having an evidentiary hearing before revocation would
therefore be helpful. In Morales-Cruz, the court was faced with
difficult facts to reconcile: the distant sex-offense, the recent
assault, and the defendant’s age and disrespect for court
170 Id.
171 Id. at 75.
172 Id. at 76.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 77 (“[The majority] confuses a possible rational inference of recidivism
and deterrence concerns as to criminal conduct generally with the entirely unfounded
speculation that Morales-Cruz presented recidivism risks and needed deterrence from
committing further sexual offenses.”).
175 Id. at 78.
176 Although the First Circuit’s statement that the defendant’s “sole objection”
does not indicate whether or not defense counsel raised this objection for the first time
on appeal, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion, id. at 72, which means defense
counsel must have objected before the District Court. Had defense counsel failed to
object, the 1st Circuit would have reviewed for plain error—a difficult position from
which to win appeal. United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 218 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (“A court of appeals typically reviews a sentencing court’s imposition of a
condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion. That standard shifts, however,
when the sentencing court affords the defendant an opportunity to object to the
condition but the defendant holds his tongue. In such circumstances, appellate review
is for plain error.” (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)).
177 See supra Part II.B.3.
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orders. On the basis of those facts the court had to predict the
likelihood of re-offense and the best condition, if any, to impose.
Two elements of the revocation procedure would have
helped: the “opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; [and] the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”178 The District Court
appears to have adopted the condition from the probation officer’s
PSR.179 Defense counsel could have cross-examined the probation
officer on some of the points eventually raised by Judge Torruella
in his dissent. Indeed, the PSR can contain the biases of its
creators.180 Thus, it is crucial that the defendant put forth a
legitimate challenge to the government’s position.
C. Rising to the Challenge
The evidentiary hearing will be helpful only if defense
counsel can and will make it meaningful. That may be a dubious
assumption.181 Limited resources and uncertainty as to the
strength of claims can influence notions of professionalism and
the choices that attorneys make.182 And given the fact-intensive183
nature of pursuing an evidentiary hearing and the unfamiliarity
with evidence-based approaches, research suggests that attorneys
will opt for a less strenuous form of advocacy.184 As Darryl Brown
notes, however, the mere fact that a form of advocacy presents
logistical difficulties does not mean that it should be avoided; on
the contrary, “[o]nce we recognize that attorneys may make
strategic choices with important substantive consequences among
basic advocacy tasks as well as among tasks that define the outer
boundaries of zeal, we see a need for more guidance (and self-
awareness) of those decisions.”185
In the context of recycled conditions and the evidentiary
hearing, the notion that education should now rise to meet the
needs of criminal procedure indicates the interconnection of
scientific research, judicial practice, and legal education.
Research has provided the data to justify a change in procedure,
but the institution of legal education must train lawyers to use
that procedure.
178 United States v. Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1997).
179 Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d at 72.
180 See supra Part II.A.
181 See Brown, supra note 24, at 2151-52.
182 Id. at 2152.
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 Id. at 2154.
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CONCLUSION
By the end of the 1970s, Apple Computer, Inc. had
already enjoyed success building computers. But the company
reached a kind of plateau. It ran great programs, but, as Steve
Jobs put it in 1980, there was a significant “barrier” between the
user and the computer—the difficulty of learning to use the
computer. In Jobs’s view, the challenge facing Apple and the
fledgling personal computer industry lay not in designing new
programs, but in creating a new computing environment that
made existing apps easier to use.186 In the context of recycled
conditions, a similar barrier exists between judges and the great
insights of evidence-based sentencing. Like the late-1970s Apple,
the traditional method of challenging conditions—the written
challenge—simply does not provide enough horsepower for
defense counsel and the sentencing judge to fully utilize the
principles of evidence-based sentencing. A new system is needed.
The process for challenging a recycled condition should
include an evidentiary hearing, which would allow defense counsel
to thoroughly test the probation officer’s recommendations.
Specifically, defense counsel could probe the reasons and
expectations underlying the recommendations. This is crucial
because research suggests recycled conditions will be
unnecessary, or even counterproductive, in many cases. Certain
types of sanctions can stigmatize a defendant, which undermines
the purpose of supervised release. What’s more, recent studies
show a downward trend in criminal behavior as offenders age.
And even if re-offense is likely, it is crucial to identify the
likely type of offense and impose sanctions in response.
Indeed, failing to match sanctions with criminal propensity
can be even more disastrous than imposing no sanctions at all.
In short, if a probation officer recommends a recycled condition,
that recommendation, which carries so much weight and will
dramatically affect the defendant’s life, should be tested in court,
under oath, and subject to cross-examination.
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